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The deregulation of public monopolies has often generated a decrease in quality and
reliability of service. Governments have coped with this issue by imposing
(MQS) to entrants but a recent stream of literature has raised
concerns about the inadequacy of this instrument. We propose an alternative, a
to be imposed on the incumbent, to overcome the competition effects that tend
to generate quality downgrading. In our model an entrant invests into quality because
the limit on the incumbent sales eliminates price wars and enable him (as well as the
incumbent) to recoup investments in quality. The maximal welfare is obtained when
the is <xed at of the initial market. leads to entrant=s
differentiation and a welfare of of the Pareto optimum while our solution leads
to a welfare of . To reach this level a MQS should be set above the ideal
level chosen by the entrant under laisser-faire.
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1 Introduction
Other compelling reasons pertain to contractibility issues and public good-like feature of quality. Auriol
(1998) provides a very interesting analysis of such issues.
Herguera & Lutz (1998) survey these issues within the context of international trade but the results they
report apply to wider domains.
As shown by Cremer & Thisse (1992) ad valorem taxes also could be used.
According to Rhoades & Waguespacks (2000) (and the reference therein) quality has
sharply decreased after the deregulation of the US airline industry. Likewise the relia-
bility of electricity provision in California has crumbled last year. The same observation
applies even more dramatically for railway transportation in England. More generally, a
government wishing to deregulate a monopolistic industry almost always faces the prob-
lem of ensuring that quality and reliability of the good or service remains high enough.
At <rst sight, one could think that competition per se is apt to increase product qual-
ity. Indeed lower quality products should not resist the challenge of higher quality ones
entering the market. Nevertheless differentiation enables several products to coexist in a
deregulated market. Choi, Lee & Cheng (2001) provide a recent case study in the Tai-
wan mobile telecommunication industry where selling a lower quality product at a lower
price appears to be an optimal strategy. Further the vertical differentiation literature has
shown that entry often reduces average quality and welfare (e.g., Crampes & Hollander
(1995)). The argument is that a <erce price competition lowers <rms revenues, thus to
keep pro<t margins at the market level <rms save on cost by disinvesting in quality.
The scenario occurring after deregulation is then very simple. Given that the incumbent
has accumulated a high quality of service thanks to past public investments, entrants
deliberately choose a lower, and thus cheaper, quality. Average quality then decreases
and since the incumbent=s pro<ts also decreases it is very likely to downgrade quality in
the future.
As a reaction governments often condition entry to quality requirements, through
contracts or more broadly by imposing Minimum Quality Standards (MQS). Beyond the
obvious agency problems relating to certi<cation and monitoring of MQS, this instrument
succeeds mainly in increasing the lowest of qualities. This may not be enough to ensure
an increase in average quality because of the general tendency to lower quality. As
shown by Lutz et al. (2000), the differentiation possibilities are reduced by the MQS and
ultimately lower pro<ts in the industry making it more difficult for an entrant to recoup
the <xed cost of entry. Hence this policy may end up limiting entry and it is no surprise
that monopolies favor such measures in the name of consumer protection. Maxwell
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(1998) takes a different point of view to show that MQS may lead to less innovation and
therefore to welfare losses. As a result of equilibrium interactions MQS tend to DhurtD
high quality providers so that the ultimate effect of MQS seems to be a downgrade of
quality from the top, especially in the long run.
The general conclusion we can draw from this literature is that MQS may not be
optimal instruments. In order to ensure quality provision while allowing for more com-
petition, governments could instead use an instrument which DcompensatesD <rms in
terms of incentives for upgrading quality to counter balance the negative effect on pro<ts
of the <erce competition at the pricing stage. In the present paper, we put forward such
an instrument. It is quite simple and easy to implement as it amounts to limit from
the outset the sales of one <rm (typically the historical incumbent). We show within a
duopoly game that a applied to the incumbent <rm is sufficient to induce
both <rms to choose higher qualities in equilibrium, as compared to .
The intuition for our result is the following: imposing a sales quota on one <rm dras-
tically weakens the incentive to differentiate products at the quality choice stage because
it dramatically relaxes competition at the pricing stage and enable <rm to secure fair
pro<t margins. When quality is not costly, the sales quota fosters minimal differentia-
tion in the sense that both <rms choose the best available quality and therefore end up
selling homogeneous goods in equilibrium. When quality is costly, <rms may or may not
choose identical qualities in equilibrium; nevertheless, average quality increases and the
degree of differentiation decreases (as compared to laisser-faire). Whether quality costs
are small or not, the public authority <nds it optimal to induce this Dquality upgrading
effectD with the help of the sales quota.
The argument is formally established in a three stage game. In the <rst stage, a
government chooses the (optimal) sales quota to be imposed on the incumbent <rm. In
the second stage the entrant selects its quality, assuming that the incumbent is already
committed to a high quality. Then price competition takes place at the third stage. We
characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game and show that both
<rms sell the (same) high quality product. Let us stress that the mechanism at work
in our model is robust to more general settings. In particular, our results qualitatively
generalize to cases where the government imposes a sales quota on the entrant as well as
to cases where qualities are chosen simultaneously by the <rms. We have retained the
particular sequence described above only for the sake of simplifying the exposition.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we recall the outcome of vertical
differentiation under laisser-faire. In section 3 we solve for price competition when the
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2 Entry under Laisser-faire and Price Competition
When quality is not costly, the entrant optimally differentiates to a ratio of
. The price equilibrium of the continuation game is unique and in pure strategies.
duopoly
monopoly
incumbent is constrained by a sales quota, then we go backward in the game tree by
considering quality choices in section 4. Section 5 derives the optimal sales quota and
compares our instrument to QMS before concluding.
In this article we put the emphasis on price competition because most of deregulations
are done with the announced aim of lowering consumer prices thereby accrediting the
idea that price is the main channel of competition in these markets. In this section we
recall how quality downgrading may occur within the vertical differentiation model of
Mussa & Rosen (1978).
Let us consider a two-stage game between an entrant and an incumbent. The incum-
bent=s quality being already high the entrant must decide in the <rst stage if he wants to
meet or differentiate downward. In the second stage, the two <rms sell indivisible goods
differentiated by their quality indexes and satisfying . Firms produce at
zero cost and maximize pro<ts by setting prices and non-cooperatively. Consumers
are willing to buy at most one unit of the good and exhibit heterogeneous preferences.
They are identi<ed by their taste for quality which is uniformly distributed on the
interval . The net utility of consuming good for the consumer with taste
is and we set the default utility of no-consumption to zero.
To address the issue of quality choices in the <rst stage we assume that <rms choose
qualities at zero cost. We shall later test the robustness of this hypothesis by introducing a
convex sunk cost. As a direct consequence of zero cost for quality we have to assume that
the range of possible qualities is bounded with . Assuming that the incumbent
has already chosen the best available quality, the subgame perfect equilibrium (in pure
strategies) of the game described above is characterized in Lemma 1.
Choi & Shin (1992) provide a proof of this standard result. However, recalling the
essence of price competition under vertical differentiation will be useful for the analysis
to follow. Figure 1 below depicts <rms= best replies in a pricing game associated with
quality choices . The price space can be partitioned in the region
where both <rms enjoy a positive market share and the region where only the
high quality <rm enjoys a positive demand. Since products exhibit different qualities,
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The upper bound should be seen as the ultimate technological advance.
the low quality <rm must offer a sufficient discount with respect to the high quality price
to compensate for the quality differential. The required discount de<nes the frontier
between the monopoly and duopoly regions.
Obviously, the low quality <rm=s best reply (denoted by ) lies in the interior of
the duopoly region. In contrast, the best reply of the high quality <rm is in the duopoly
region only against low . Against higher prices, the high quality <rm optimally excludes
the low quality product and enters into the monopoly region. Either by naming the limit
price which is just sufficient for this purpose (in which case its best reply is at the frontier
between the two regions) or by naming the monopoly price(which is in the present case).
As for quality choices, the intuition is well-known: choosing the same quality as the
incumbent can only result into marginal cost pricing in equilibrium whereas differenti-
ating allows for positive pro<ts. Against a high quality, the entrant therefore optimally
differentiates to relax price competition. Note that the differentiation argument is qual-
itatively independent of costs for quality (see Motta (1993)). As we show in Lemma 2 of
the appendix, adding a convex cost for quality yields even more extreme results. For
, the incumbent choice is while the entrant chooses thus whenever
the incumbent has not chosen the maximal quality ( ) the entrant differentiates at a
very low ratio of As the cost for quality becomes lower ( ) the incumbent
selects the best available quality while the entrant differentiates at a ratio increasing
towards (at the limit ).
Hence taking into account the cost of acquiring quality only reinforces differentiation
and the potential concern of the government for quality downgrading. Further the liter-
ature on quantity competition has shown that quality differentiation appears only when
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3 The Effect of a Sales Quota on Price Competition
In the present case, the residual demand is in fact independent of the particular rationing rule. Note that
a similar conclusion does not apply for the alternative quality hierarchy.
it allows <rms to save on (sunk) costs. The general conclusion under laisser-faire is that
cost for quality and price competition are the factors leading to quality differentiation
and average downgrading.
Imposing a sales quota to a <rm is identical to assume that its production capacity
is limited. Hence a Bertrand-Edgeworth analysis is called for since the incumbent may
face a demand exceeding its capacity. When the entrant=s price is very large relative to
the incumbent=s one some consumers are rationed by the incumbent and may
wish to transfer their purchase on the entrant.
This mere fact dramatically alters the nature of price competition because it allows
for a new strategy pro<le. The entrant could indeed <nd it pro<table to name a high
price, anticipating that some consumers will be rationed by the incumbent and thus be
recovered. This strategy amounts to enjoy a high unit margin on a limited market share.
The pro<tability of this strategy (relative to the more standard aggressive strategy)
depends on the propensity of rationed consumers to transfer their purchase to the entrant
instead of refraining from consuming, i.e. on the importance of the spillovers, which in
turn depend on who the rationed consumers are and on the substitutability of the goods.
This Bertrand-Edgeworth argument has been extensively developed in markets for ho-
mogeneous goods and it is well-known that equilibrium outcomes are heavily dependent
on the rationing rule retained for the analysis (see in particular Davidson & Deneckere
(1986)). Most papers however retain the so-called rationing rule (see Deneckere
et al. (2000)) and we shall adopt a comparable rationing rule by endorsing the inter-
pretation put forward by Tirole (1988): rationed consumers are those who exhibit the
lowest taste for the product. In our framework a consumer wishing to buy the high
quality product but rationed by the incumbent always prefers to buy the low quality
product of the entrant instead of refraining from consuming. Thus if at the prevailing
prices the demand addressed to the incumbent exceeds the quota all rationed consumers
are recovered by the entrant who faces a residual market over which it maximizes
pro<ts.
Krishna (1989) provides a characterization of equilibrium pricing in a similar setting.
Our analysis can be viewed as an application of her methodology to vertical differentia-
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binding non-binding
Assume . The price equilibrium is unique and there exists a
threshold quota such that
if , the laisser-faire equilibrium prevails
if , the entrant randomizes over and some lower price while the incumbent
plays a pure strategy.
Proof
tion. The space of prices can be divided in the and the regions. As
we show afterwards there exists a function such that when the entrant price is
larger than the demand addressed to the incumbent exceeds its capacity. There are
thus two competition regimes. In the binding regime ( ), the entrant recovers
all rationed consumers and becomes a monopoly over a restricted market of size .
The optimal price is independent of the incumbent=s one and is referred to as the Dse-
curityD strategy (it yields a minimax payoff). As for the incumbent, sales are constant
and equal to the capacity thus the optimal price is . In the other regime the
traditional Bertrand analysis applies: <rms <ght for market shares and get low pro<ts
whenever one price is low.
The crucial point then is to observe that the entrant will choose security over aggres-
siveness against an aggressive (low) and the contrary if is large. The switch from
one regime to the other take place at the price where the entrant is indifferent between
the two options. In contrast, the incumbent=s best reply is continuous. The discontinu-
ity in the entrant best reply precludes the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for
many parameter constellations but in the present setting, we can apply the equilibrium
characterization proposed by Krishna (1989) to obtain the following proposition.
The frontier between the two price regimes is found by equating the incumbent
with the sales quota . It leads to the equation
The demands are therefore
if
if
(1)
and
if
if
(2)
In the binding regime, the incumbent faces a constant demand, thus increasing pro<ts.
It chooses the maximal price which is by de<nition the frontier price . Using the
continuity of payoffs, we note that this price is itself dominated by the best reply of the
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non binding regime. The latter is whenever it is attainable. The best
reply of the incumbent is continuous with a kink at , the solution
to . Formally, we obtain
if
if
(3)
The analysis is more involved for the entrant because the optimal behavior in the two
regimes are quite different. In the binding regime, the entrant acts as a monopoly over
a market of size , thus the pro<t reaches a maximum of at the security
price . In the non binding regime, the best reply is which
amounts to <ght for market shares and yields a payoff increasing in . It remains to
choose between those two candidate best replies by solving
.
To analyze the position of this benchmark and choose between and , con-
sider the pair of prices at the intersection of and on Figure 2 below.
As is continuous and increasing over in the binding regime, is
dominated by . It follows from this simple observation that and that
against a relatively low , the entrant is inclined to use whereas it <ghts for market
shares against high incumbent prices. Formally, we obtain
if
if
(4)
Note that is discontinuous, so that we cannot ensure the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium. Because , the only candidate for a pure strategy
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4 Quality Selection: Imitation vs. Differentiation
equilibrium is the laisser-faire equilibrium . For this equilibrium to exist, it must
be true that (unlike on Figure 2 above) (a convex
function increasing from to ). Otherwise, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the
only candidate for an equilibrium is while the entrant randomizes between
and , the weights over those two atoms being such that is indeed
a best reply against the mixture.
Notice that if the entrant were facing a sales quota the analysis would be more
involved because of additional spillovers effects. However, the qualitative conclusions
of the present section would be preserved: either the laisser-faire equilibrium holds (for
loose quotas and high quality differentials) or the non-constrained <rm uses a mixed
strategy in equilibrium that pays her according to the size of the residual market i.e.,
. Since the equilibrium identi<ed in Proposition 1 can be viewed as a particular case
of Krishna (1989) we refer the reader to her paper for additional comments and turn now
to the issue of quality selection.
As previously shown the sales quota alters equilibrium behavior in the pricing game thus
equilibrium payoffs. We may expect <rms= incentives to be altered at the quality stage as
well. We show in this section that when quality is not costly, the presence of a capacity
constraint fosters . The intuition is easy to grasp. Given the
incumbent=s high quality and sales quota, the entrant can select the kind of equilibrium
prevailing in the pricing game by adequately choosing its quality ( see Figure
3 below). In the laisser-faire regime the entrant incentives are to differentiate to (if
possible) whereas in the binding regime the entrant=s payoff does not depend on the
incumbent price but on the residual demand and its own quality thus it is lead to choose
the highest possible quality. It is clear that the binding regime will be prefered by the
entrant only if the residual market is large enough or equivalently if the quota is not too
loose ( on Figure 3 below).
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When quality is not costly, the entrant chooses the best quality (like the
incumbent) if the incumbent-s sales quota is lesser than of the market size,
otherwise the entrant differentiates to a ratio of . The incumbent has an incentive to
upgrade its own quality if it was not already the highest possible when anticipating entry.
Proof When the price equilibrium is in mixed strategies the entrant=s equilibrium
pro<t can be computed with any of the prices in the support of its strategy. With
the security price the entrant has sales of thus its equilibrium pro<t
is . For the price equilibrium is always in mixed
strategies (binding regime on Figure 3 above) so that the highest quality (imitation of
the incumbent) is the optimal choice. For the entrant can enter the binding regime
by selecting a high quality such that (beware of the axes reversal on Figure
3). The optimal choice is still imitation of the incumbent. Alternatively the entrant can
choose the non-binding regime by selecting a low quality such that In that
case the laisser-faire equilibrium prevails and we have already seen in Lemma 1 that the
unconditional best reply of the low quality <rm was . Thus the best differentiation
decision is (the kinked curve on Figure 3 above).
It remains to compare, for , the respective bene<ts of imitation and differenti-
ation. With imitation the pro<t is while under differentiation it is lesser or equal
to The cut-off is .
For the second part of the proposition, proved in Lemma 3 of the appendix, we start
from and show that in equilibrium of the binding regime is
increasing with .
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5 Sales Quota vs. Quality Minimum Standard
Friedman & Thisse [93] obtain minimal differentiation in a horizontal differentiation framework but rely
on partial price collusion. Schmitt [95] reports a minimal differentiation outcome but requires two distinct
markets.
We have also performed all our computations with an alternative cost function to ensure that our qualitative
results still hold in the more realistic case where the top quality is in<nitely costly to achieve.
The formal derivation of these results have not been reported in the paper but are available upon request
from the authors.
This proposition is in striking contrast with the quite general principle of differen-
tiation prevailing in standard differentiation models and we know of no other similar
result in a purely non-cooperative setting of price competition within a single market
It is therefore important to assess the robustness of Proposition 2 with respect to the
assumption of zero costs for quality.
To this end we assume that a <rm has to incur a cost in order to produce the
quality level ( ). We maintain the assumption of an upper bound for quality at
. The cost is sunk when price competition takes place. Under laisser-faire (LF)
and , the incumbent chooses maximal quality with while the entrant
differentiate to leading to a <nal increasing concave payoff (cf.
Lemma 2 in the appendix). Under sales quota of the entrant=s pro<t is
and is maximal for Hence for and the entrant
chooses the highest quality in the binding regime. The <nal pro<t being
the entrant has indeed no incentive to differentiate. More thorough computations show
that the results of Proposition 2 are robust to the introduction of the new assumptions
in the following sense:
- If quality costs are DnegligibleD ( large), product imitation prevails at the equilibrium
of the entry game.
- If quality costs are Dsigni<cantD, <rms differentiate in equilibrium, but the degree of
quality differentiation is lower than under laisser-faire.
Moreover, in the case where equilibrium differentiation prevails, both the low and
the high quality levels are above those prevailing under laisser-faire. In other words the
quality upgrading effect that follows the introduction of a sales quota is quite strong
since all equilibrium quality selections improve upon the standard ones.
In this <nal section we aim at comparing quantitative restraints and MQS as instruments
ensuring quality provision. We <rst consider the optimal sales quota for a government
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For a positive cost of quality the upper limit yielding imitation is slightly lesser than
When quality is not costly, the optimal sales quota to be imposed on the
incumbent by the government is of the market size.
laisser-faire
sales quota
aiming at maximizing total welfare. On the one hand, any degree of differentiation
leads to a lower consumer surplus thus the government should seek to maximize quality.
On the other hand the sales quota tends to raises prices thereby limiting the access of
poor consumers to the service. Trading-off these effects we obtain (proof in Lemma 4 of
appendix)
Setting the surplus under the Pareto optimum at , yields a surplus
of while the optimal yields a surplus of To make a rough
comparison with MQS we compute in Lemma 2 of the appendix the total surplus when
the government imposes a MQS on the entrant. To reach the level associated
to the optimal sales quota the MQS should be set at which is above the
level chosen by the entrant under laisser-faire ( ). The cost of enforcing such a
dramatic increase of quality may well be prohibitive for the government.
Furthermore as the MQS is followed by a quasi Bertrand competition, equilibrium
pro<ts are very low ( of the Pareto surplus for the entrant and for the incumbent)
thus as soon as there are some cost to acquire quality the entrant will not enter. As we
show in the appendix a cost factor would not permit the entrant to recoup the
entry cost of producing the QMS
Whatever the positive effect of a MQS, imposing a sales quota on top of it will lead
to a quality increase. Consider indeed the optimal quality levels and retained by
the <rms under any MQS. By de<nition of optimality, it must be true that for each <rm
the corresponding level equalizes the marginal value of quality and its marginal costs,
other things being equal. Consider then the effect of a sales quota imposed on a <rm at
a level corresponding to its equilibrium sales given . This raises both <rms= pro<ts by
relaxing price competition (see Krishna (1989)) thus it also raises the marginal value of
a quality improvement. Therefore, each <rm would increase its quality. Intuitively, the
main virtue of the capacity limitation, as compared to MQS, lies precisely in its ability
to preserve a direct incentive to raise qualities, by ensuring large enough pro<ts even if
there is no quality differentiation.
To conclude let us recall the achievement of our model. Using a stylized vertical
differentiation framework we have shown that a sales quota deeply alters <rm=s decisions
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As will be discussed later on, this particular assumption of partial market coverage does not affect quali-
tatively our results.
regarding quality selection. When quality is not costly, the result is striking as duopolists
provide the <rst-best quality level. A sales quota turns out to be a very effective mean of
ensuring the provision of a high quality service as it relaxes price competition whatever
the quality differential existing between <rms. Roughly speaking, the constrained <rm
wishes to maximize revenues from selling at full capacity whereas the unconstrained one
wishes to maximize the value of its residual market. In both cases, this is achieved
through quality upgrading.
Observe <rst from the set-up of the model that for , the consumer
located at enjoys zero utility. Hence every consumer with taste is willing
to buy product at the price . Potential markets are respectively and .
We now identify the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the two products
and . Solving for , we obtain . Any consumer
prefers to whereas the contrary prevails for Observing that quality
levels can be re-scaled, we set without loss of generality so that the demands are
if
if
and
if
if
.
The particular shape of demands reMects the fact that in vertically differentiated
markets the high quality <rm may exclude the low quality one from the market. The
latter, in order to enjoy a positive market share, must quote a price signi<cantly lower
than to compensate for its lower quality. Note also that since , the market
cannot be covered in equilibrium, expect perhaps for the case where .
The pro<t function of the low quality <rm is
. The solution to is and since always lies strictly
in the region where <rm enjoys a positive market share, the low quality best reply
function is .
In the monopoly region ( ), the best reply of the high quality <rm is the
monopoly price which is feasible if and only if . Otherwise is strictly
increasing in the monopoly region and we always reach the duopoly region where the
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pro<t is . The solution to is
; it is interior to the monopoly area if which holds true if
and only if . Otherwise, is strictly decreasing in the duopoly region
and the frontier price is optimal. As we have , the (kinked) best reply
of <rm is
if
if
if
(5)
As one can see on Figure 1 in the text, the unlimited capacity equilibrium
is given by the intersection of and .
In the quality stage the pro<t of <rm is
if
if
(6)
where and . Let
solve and solve . The equilibrium is the solution of
and because the entrant cannot leapfrog above the incumbent
without making losses for any Our numerical computations
(formulas are available upon request) show that for , and thus
whenever the incumbent has not chosen the maximal quality the entrant differentiates
at a very low ratio of If the cost for quality is lower ( ) then and
and
Let us consider the imposition of a MQS when quality is not costly. The entrant
will choose a quality equal to the MQS as it wishes to differentiate more. The price
equilibrium is , , equilibrium demands are ,
and equilibrium pro<ts are leading to a total surplus of
(7)
an increasing concave almost linear function with limit at . To reach the level
of surplus generated by the optimal sales quota the MQS must be set at
The maximal QMS permitting entry for cost factor solves and is
where The
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minimal cost factor permitting to implement is
In the binding regime, Proposition 1 tells us that the unique equilibrium sees
the incumbent playing the pure strategy while the entrant is playing the mixed
strategy de<ned as Dplay and with respective probabilities
and .D. Pro<ts are therefore
(8)
and
(9)
We saw in the text that the entrant best reply is
if
if
We now want to show that the incumbent <nds it optimal to choose the best available
quality. To this end we need to compute precisely the mixed strategy equilibrium. We
let stands for it varies in .
The optimal incumbent price solves
In equilibrium we also have thus . Plugging
this last result into the pro<t function, we obtain . Using
, we <nally express the reduced form of the incumbent=s pro<t
as . Algebraic manipulations show that is proportional
to which is negative as . Recalling now that stands for , we can
conclude that, as in laisser-faire, the incumbent=s pro<t increases with its own quality,
we have .
For the entrant chooses the highest quality and competition takes
places in a market for an homogeneous good. This setting has been studied by Levitan
& Shubik (1972) who identify the price equilibrium. Letting <rms play
a mixed strategy with support and cumulative distributions ,
. Observe that , ,
and thus only the entrant has an atom at the upper price . In this
equilibrium the incumbent pro<t is (at the lowest price it gets the whole
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demand thus sells because implies that the incumbent
is capacity constrained) while the entrant gets (at the highest price
it gets the residual demand ). There is continuity for the entrant pro<t since
thus the exact imitation with is indeed the optimal
decision for the entrant.
We now compute the consumer surplus. The surplus of the consumer located at is
best understood by separating 2 cases:
- if then because . The incumbent price is the lowest with
probability in which case the consumer buys at the price (because
and the incumbent is not constrained) so that we need to compute an expectation.
With complementary probability, the consumer buys at the entrant, thus the surplus of
consumer is
- if and then the consumer is rationed by the incumbent and does not
buy at all. When (and ) the surplus of consumer is because he
is rationed by the incumbent.
Integrating with respect to the distribution of domestic prices, we have three cases
according to the respective positions of and the upper price limit:
- if ,
- if ,
- if ,
Integrating with respect to the uniform distribution of consumers over the range of
potential buyers i.e., , we get the consumer surplus
(10)
which is an increasing concave function. Observe that is the total surplus at
the outcome of Bertrand competition between two identical products where no consumers
refrain from buying, all consumers buy the best available quality and <rms capture no
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The proof can be adapted to the case of convex quality cost with the same qualitative results.
rent. This is also the Pareto optimum in our simple model. To conclude the total surplus
is this function is increasing concave
with and
If the sales quota is looser than , the entrant will optimally differentiate
to and in the pricing sub-game, <rms play the classical pure strategy equilibrium
. The optimal demands are thus and the pro<ts
. The total surplus is easily computed as
(11)
hence the optimal choice for the public authority is to set the sales quota of
the market.
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